

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

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FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8884

INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE

ANXQISY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE 2937

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 ANKARA 3136

EXDIS

FROM HARTMAN

EO 11652 GDS

TAGS: PFOR, TU, CY, GR, MASS

SUBJECT: HARTMAN'S TALKS WITH FONMIN CAGLAYANGIL

1. FIRST DAY ANKARA, APRIL 21, WAS LARGELY OCCUPIED WITH TWO SESSIONS OF TWO HOURS EACH WITH CAGLAYANGIL. TURKISH POSITION WAS MUCH AS WE HAD EXPECTED.

2. DURING MORNING SESSION, EACH SIDE SET FORTH ITS POSITION ON AID EMBARGO, CYPRUS, AND GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS.

3. I BEGAN BY EXPLAINING MY VISIT AS A CONTINUATION OF THE SECRETARY'S VISIT LAST MONTH. I DESCRIBED IN SOME DETAIL CONGRESSIONAL ACTION AND SOUNDINGS SINCE THEN, INCLUDING SFRC VOTE, THE PRESIDENT'S AND SECRETARY'S STATEMENTS, AND FAVORABLE SHIFT IN CONGRESSIONAL SENTIMENT. RE CURRENT SITUATION IN SENATE, I MENTIONED PREOCCUPATION WITH SOUTHEAST ASIA, ALONG WITH OUR ASSESSMENT, SHARED BY A NUMBER OF CONGRESSMEN, THAT SENATE WAS LOOKING FOR A DEVELOPMENT THAT WOULD PERMIT MEMBERS TO REVERSE THEIR VOTES, WITH SIMILAR SENTIMENT IN HOUSE WHERE TASK OF REVERSING VOTES WAS MORE DIFFICULT.

4. I EXPRESSED OUR VIEW THAT CONGRESSIONAL ACTION HAD BEEN
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HARMFUL TO OUR RELATIONS WITH TURKEY, SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS

IN AREA, NEGOTIATIONS ON CYPRUS, AND GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS, AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO LINK BETWEEN ARMS QUESTION AND CYPRUS. HOWEVER, AS TURKEY MOVED TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS IN ACCORD WITH ITS OWN TIMING, VISIBLE SIGNS OF PROGRESS WOULD BE HELPFUL.

5. RE CYPRUS, I SPOKE OF OUR IMPRESSION FROM TALKS WITH BITSIOS AND CARAMANLIS THAT GREEK GOVERNMENT WANTED EARLY AGREEMENT, AND WOULD BE PREPARED TO GO FAR IN MEETING TURKISH POSITION ON BIZONAL PRINCIPAL AS LONG AS THEIR CONCERN RE ECONOMIC VIABILITY OF GREEK SECTOR COULD BE SATISFIED.

6. RE GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS, I NOTED THAT WHILE TALKS IN VIENNA WERE IMPORTANT, AT SAME TIME IT WAS IMPORTANT TO SEEK UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY, FOR DIRECT CONTACTS.

7. CAGLAYANGIL ASKED THAT I CONVEY HIS APPRECIATION TO THE SECRETARY FOR HIS INTEREST IN TURKEY'S PROBLEMS AND HIS HAVING SENT AN EMISSARY TO DISCUSS THEM. HE REVIEWED HIS UNDERSTANDING OF CONGRESSIONAL SITUATION AND STRESSED POINT THAT VIETNAM SITUATION WHICH WAS CAUSING DELAY IN SENATE'S CONSIDERATION OF TURKISH AID PROBLEM, MADE IT ALL THE MORE URGENT THAT AID BE RESTORED URGENTLY. TURKISH PUBLIC, HE SAID, WAS ASKING QUESTIONS. "WHEN OUR SECURITY IS THREATENED WHAT WILL THIS ALLY, ON WHOM WE RELY, REALLY DO?"

8. CAGLAYANGIL GAVE LENGTHY EXPLANATION OF TURKEY'S INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION AS A DEMOCRATIC COUNTRY IN A SEA OF TOTALITARIANISM. SOCIALISTS WERE NOT ABLE TO ORGANIZE OPENLY, AND HAD TEMPORARILY GIVEN THEIR SUPPORT TO ECECIT'S PARTY, THE RPP. SOONER OR LATER SOCIALISTS WOULD BE REPRESENTED BY SEPARATE POLITICAL PARTIES, BUT MEANWHILE, THEY WOULD CLAIM TO ACT ON DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPALS WHILE IN FACT USING TOTALITARIANISM LEFTIST METHODS. THIS MADE IT DIFFICULT FOR PRESENT GOVERNMENT TO FOLLOW A PRO-US POLICY.

9. CAGLAYANGIL'S ONLY REFERENCE TO POSSIBLE ACTION AGAINST US INSTALLATIONS IN TURKEY WAS TO NOTE THAT PRESS AND PEOPLE WERE SAYING TURKEY HAD US INSTALLATIONS TO COLLECT INFORMATION
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ON A VERY POWERFUL NEIGHBOR AND WERE ASKING "HOW LONG WILL THE GOT CONTINUE TO ASSUME THIS RISK AND WHY?"

10. CAGLAYANGIL EXPLAINED THAT TURKISH PUBLIC OPINION AND HIS COALITION PARTNERS WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO ACCEPT TURKEY'S MAKING CONCESSIONS IN ORDER TO REVERSE THE AID CUTOFF. HOWEVER, GOT COULD STATE THAT CYPRUS PROBLEM HAS BEEN A CHRONIC ONE, AND THEN IDENTIFY THE ISSUES TURKEY COULD AGREE

ON AND ASK COALITION PARTNERS AND THE OPPOSITION TO TAKE IT OR
LEAVE IT AND MAKE DECISION IN THE INTEREST OF TURKEY.

11. CAGLAYANGIL SAID IT WAS NECESSARY TO START A NEGOTIATING
PROCESS. HE REFERRED TO PROBLEM WITH GREEK FOREIGN MINISTRY
WHICH DID NOT APPEAR INFORMED REGARDING OFFER BY STAVROPOULOS,
ON INSTRUCTIONS FRM CARAMANLIS, TO BEGIN PREPARATORY TALKS
WITH A TURKISH REPRESENTATIVE IN GENEVA. CONCESSIONS, HE
SAID, COULD NOT BE MADE BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS. TURKEY HAD
ALREADY SHOWN IT GOOD WILL BY OFFERING TO OPEN FAMAGUSTA
PORT AND THE NICOSIA AIRPORT AND BY WITHDRAWING SOME TROOPS.
HE HAD IMPRESSION HE WAS BEING ASKED TO WHISPER IN SOMEONE
ELSE'S EAR WHAT COULD BE CONCEDED, BUT IN FACT HE COULD SAY
IT ALOUD. TURKISH GOVERNMENT WOULD BE READY TO
DISCUSS, IN ADDITION TO CYPRUS, ALL OTHER PROBLEMS
INCLUDING CONTINENTAL SHELF, INTERNATIONAL WATERS, REARMING
OF GREEK ISLANDS, AND THE MINORITY PROBLEMS, ALL OF
WHICH COULD BE SOLVED.

12. DURING AFTERNOON SESSION I COMMENTED ON CAGLAYANGIL'S
MORNING PRESENTATION BY REFERRING TO SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES
IN CONGRESS, RATHER THAN ANTI-TURKISH BIAS, THAT HAD BROUGHT
ABOUT EMBARGO. I THEN ASKED, IN VIEW OF APPARENT CONFUSION
IN TURKISH MINDS RE GREEK POSITION ON BILATERAL TALKS, WHETHER
I COULD INDICATE TO GREEK GOVERNMENT THAT TURKEY WAS READY TO
DISCUSS BROADER RANGE OF ISSUES PARALLEL WITH VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS.
CAGLAYANGIL SAID HE DID NOT WANT ME TO MENTION DIFFICULTIES
TURKS WERE HAVING IN ARRANGING PREPARATORY TALKS WITH
DIFFERENT LEVELS OF GREEK GOVERNMENT, BUT I COULD TELL GOG
THAT TURKISH GOVERNMENT HONESTLY WANTS TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS,
PROVIDED OTHER SIDE SHOWS SAME DESIRE.

13. IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION ON HOW TURKS VIEWED PROSPECTS NKN HGONFJMO
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HCAGLAYANGIL MENTIONED PROBLEMS IN GETTING TALKS
STARTED IN FORUM SATISFACTORY TO TURKEY, AND
EXPRESSED FEAR THAT MAKARIOS MIGHT TRY TO ENHANCE HIS OWN
POSITION THROUGH VIENNA TALKS. HE THOUGHT CLERIDES WOULD
TRY TO GET A SETTLEMENT TO ENHANCE HIS POSITION AS HEIR
TO MAKARIOS AND TO USE IN BETTERING HIS FUTURE RELATIONS WITH
TURKISH CYPRIOTS AND GOT. THIS, HE SAID, WAS A

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POSITIVE FACTOR. HIS CONCERN, HOWEVER, WAS THAT GREEKS MIGHT TRY TO MAKE IT LOOK AS IF TURKS WERE BLOCKING AGREEMENTS AT VIENNA. NEVERTHELESS, TURKEY WOULD GO TO VIENNA WITH GOOD WILL AND TRY TO ACHIEVE A SOLUTION.

14. I CONVEYED OUR IMPRESSION THAT CLERIDES WAS TENDING TOWARD TURKISH POSITION ON TWO ZONES AND THAT HE HAS GOG SUPPORT. WHILE WE THOUGHT DIRECT TURKISH-GREEK TALKS WOULD BE HELPFUL, ONLY STATESMEN COULD PROVIDE POLITICAL FRAMEWORK FOR DISCUSSION OF DETAILS BY TECHNICIANS.

15. CAGLAYANGIL REPLIED THAT IF VIENNA TALKS BEGAN WELL, AND AFTER PREPARATORY TALKS AT STAVROPOULOS LEVEL, HE MIGHT HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH BITSIOS BEFORE THE NATO SUMMIT TO HELP PREPARE GROUND FOR A MEETING IN BRUSSELS BETWEEN CARAMANLIS AND DEMIREL. HE THOUGHT ENTIRE FIRST DAY IN BRUSSELS SHOULD BE SET ASIDE FOR BILATERAL CONTACTS. HE HAD INSTRUCTED ESENBEL TO RETURN TO WASHINGTON TO SEE THE SECRETARY AND TRY TO ARRANGE FOR DEMIREL TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT FORD IN BRUSSELS (EMBTel 3112) ON MAY 29. HE THOUGHT FAVORABLE ATMOSPHERE IN VIENNA FOLLOWED BY TURKISH-US AND TURKISH-GREEK MEETINGS AT NATO SUMMIT MIGHT REPRESENT SUFFICIENT PROGRESS FOR THOSE IN CONGRESS WHO WISHED TO CHANGE THEIR POSITION ON TURKISH AID.

16. I REPLIED THAT CAGLAYANGIL'S SUGGESTIONS WERE CONSTRUCTIVE
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AND THAT I WOULD REPORT HIS REQUEST FOR BILATERAL MEETINGS MAY 29. I THEN REFERRED TO THE SECRETARY'S PREVIOUS

SUGGESTION THAT A NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK MIGHT BE ACHIEVED WHICH WOULD NOT INVOLVE ADVANCE CONCESSIONS BUT RATHER AN INDICATION OF THE POSITION FROM WHICH THE TWO PARTIES COULD BEGIN TO DISCUSS THE ISSUES.

17. CAGLAYANGIL AGAIN DESCRIBED POLITICAL PROBLEM FOR TURKISH GOVERNMENT IN DEALING WITH THE PUBLIC AND OPPOSITION WHICH WERE SUSPICIOUS OF "CONCESSIONS." HE SUGGESTED THAT, AFTER NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN, TURKISH GOVERNMENT COULD TAKE FIRST RESULTS TO COALITION PARTNERS AND OPPOSITION AND OBTAIN THEIR AGREEMENT ON A SOLUTION WHICH WOULD BE IN NATIONAL INTEREST AND ACCEPTABLE TO PUBLIC OPINION. "TERRIROT," HE SAID, "IS EASY TO SEIZE BUT MORE DIFFICULT TO SURRENDER."

18. CAGLAYANGIL SAID HE RECOGNIZED THAT BOTH GREEK AND TURKISH GOVERNMENTS HAVE DOMESTIC PROBLEMS WHICH REQUIRE THEM AT TIMES TO SPEAK WITH TWO VOICES, BUT SINCE THEY WERE EXPERIENCED, THEY COULD DEAL WITH THIS PROBLEM

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FIND A WAY TO PREPARE OPPOSITION AND COALITION PARTNERS, AND CARAMANLIS WOULD HVE TO FIND HIS OWN METHOD TO DO THE SAME. HE WAS NOW READY TO MEET WITH BITSIOS. IT WAS NOT NECESSARY THAT THEY SOLVE MAJOR PROBLEMS, BUT THEIR DIRECT DISCUSSIONS COULD BE CONSIDERED A SUCCESS, AND THEN THEY WOULD KNOW WHETHER THEY WERE ON RIGHT TRACK OR SOME OTHER OPTION SHOULD BE PURSUED. TO REACH SOLUTIOLAGREECE AND TURKEY WOULD BOTH HAVE TO BURY THEIR COMPLEXES. IN CONCLUSION, HE REFERRED TO TURKEY'S TIES WITH THE "MOST POWERFUL WESTERN NATION WITH WHOM WE HAVE LINKED OUR DESTINY." HE HOPED US WOULD NOT, IN ITS DECISIONS, MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR TURKISH GOVERNMENT.

18. BEFORE MEETING WITH PRESS, CAGLAYANGIL EXPLAINED THAT IT WAS WIDELY BELIEVED THAT I HAD COME TO ANKARA TO MAKE DEMANDS ON NEW TURKISH GOVERNMENT. HE THEREFORE WISHED IN HIS STATEMENT TO THE PRESS (SEPTTEL) TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THIS WAS NOT THE CASE.

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